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Abstract
Background: The all-hazards willingness to respond (WTR) of local public health personnel is critical to emergency
preparedness. This study applied a threat-and efficacy-centered framework to characterize these workers’ scenario
and jurisdictional response willingness patterns toward a range of naturally-occurring and terrorism-related
emergency scenarios.
Methods: Eight geographically diverse local health department (LHD) clusters (four urban and four rural) across the
U.S. were recruited and administered an online survey about response willingness and related attitudes/beliefs
toward four different public health emergency scenarios between April 2009 and June 2010 (66% response rate).
Responses were dichotomized and analyzed using generalized linear multilevel mixed model analyses that also
account for within-cluster and within-LHD correlations.
Results: Comparisons of rural to urban LHD workers showed statistically significant odds ratios (ORs) for WTR
context across scenarios ranging from 1.5 to 2.4. When employees over 40 years old were compared to their
younger counterparts, the ORs of WTR ranged from 1.27 to 1.58, and when females were compared to males, the
ORs of WTR ranged from 0.57 to 0.61. Across the eight clusters, the percentage of workers indicating they would
be unwilling to respond regardless of severity ranged from 14-28% for a weather event; 9-27% for pandemic
influenza; 30-56% for a radiological ‘dirty’ bomb event; and 22-48% for an inhalational anthrax bioterrorism event.
Efficacy was consistently identified as an important independent predictor of WTR.
Conclusions: Response willingness deficits in the local public health workforce pose a threat to all-hazards
response capacity and health security. Local public health agencies and their stakeholders may incorporate key
findings, including identified scenario-based willingness gaps and the importance of efficacy, as targets of
preparedness curriculum development efforts and policies for enhancing response willingness. Reasons for an
increased willingness in rural cohorts compared to urban cohorts should be further investigated in order to
understand and develop methods for improving their overall response.
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Background
Effective response to public health emergencies is based
not only on the ability of the members of the public
health workforce to respond, but also on their willingness
to respond (WTR). Previous research has identified abil-
ity as conceptually and operationally distinct from will-
ingness [1,2] and has suggested that WTR is rooted in
risk perception theory [3]. Studies have pointed to WTR
as a function of the interplay between perceptions of
threat and efficacy toward a hazard [4,5]. Research has
also identified WTR as a requisite for quality in public
health systems’ response efforts, as response willingness
is fundamental to response capacity [6]. Examples in
which low WTR had the potential to hinder public health
and healthcare response to an infectious disease outbreak
have been reported [4,7-11].
The above insights are salient in light of the Institute of
Medicine’s recognition of limits in emergency response
surge capacity [12]. Such limitations are germane to local
health departments (LHDs), which are at the hub of the
public health emergency preparedness system [13] but
have faced significant staffing constraints due to fiscal
austerity. A survey of U.S. LHDs in early 2010 revealed
that between January 2008 and December 2009, these
agencies collectively lost approximately 15% of their
workforce due to budget cutbacks, and nearly half of all
LHDs anticipated further budget cuts [14].
Given the need for LHDs to meet all-hazards response
expectations despite staffing constraints, the local public
health workforce’s emergency response willingness has
profound implications for health security in the face of
an ever-broadening array of threats. Previous research
among non-public health agency responders has found
WTR to be scenario-specific [2]. Thus far, research on
LHD workers’ WTR has focused on pandemic influenza
as the scenario of interest [10,11], leaving important gaps
in understanding this occupational cohort’s relative atti-
tudes toward response to other categories of public
health threats. Further, prior LHD-based WTR research
has not explicitly addressed potential jurisdictional differ-
ences in WTR by urban versus rural categorization. Such
a comparative examination is relevant because research
has pointed to distinct challenges following a public
health emergency based on jurisdictional size and related
infrastructure considerations [15]. Moreover, research to
date on WTR among LHD workers has been relatively
circumscribed in its jurisdictional coverage [10,11].
A more robust, scenario-based understanding of the
local public health workforce’s response willingness is
critical for gauging public health system preparedness
within the all-hazards spectrum and for identifying
potential avenues to enhance it. In an effort to address
some of these gaps, the present study’s aims are to assess
determinants of local public health workers’ response
willingness toward a range of representative public health
emergency scenarios, in a set of geographically diverse
urban and rural U.S. public health jurisdictions.
Methods
Study design and implementation
Research ethics approval for the study was received from
the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Institutional Review Board (JHSPH IRB) (exempt status #
45 CFR 46.101 (b) (2)). Per JHSPH IRB approval, written
consent from the participants was not required, because
the research presented no more than minimal risk to
subjects and involved no procedures for which written
consent is normally required. The JHSPH IRB-approved
materials included a written disclosure describing the
study, and emphasizing voluntary participation. Verbal
consent was not requested or required by JHSPH IRB for
this approved study.
The research team provided an online survey, the Johns
Hopkins ~ Public Health Infrastructure Response Survey
Tool [JH ~ PHIRST], to assess emergency response will-
ingness among public health workers in eight LHD clus-
ters. Each cluster included three or more proximate or
contiguous counties/jurisdictions. Based on U.S. Census
data [16] and consistent with previous population-related
research on LHDs [17], a rural cluster was defined as one
where the average LHD serves residents in county(ies)
whose average population is under 50,000 residents,
whereas an urban cluster was defined as one where the
average LHD serves residents in county(ies) whose average
population is greater than 50,000 residents.
Convenience sampling was used for cluster recruitment,
based on previously identified professional contacts from
each cluster, with an effort toward achieving geographic
and jurisdictional diversity. Primary contacts were asked
to identify and invite neighboring counties/jurisdictions to
consider participation in the project via a snowball sam-
pling approach, to reach a three-county per cluster mini-
mum. In most cases, the primary contacts made efforts to
engage and identify more than three counties per cluster.
A Collaboration Agreement was signed by each participat-
ing LHD within a cluster. After all administrative forms
were processed and participation was confirmed, research-
ers worked directly with cluster contacts to set a mutually
agreed-upon date to launch the baseline survey. On the
date of the baseline survey launch, LHD contacts were
sent an email that they forwarded to their employee list-
serv announcing the start of the baseline survey. In the
email, employees were asked to click on an embedded link
that took them to a registration site independent of the
data collection/analysis process. The registration site
required them to create an account and set up a username
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and password, which then generated a personalized link
containing a unique, randomly-created identifier to Sur-
veyMonkey (SurveyMonkey.com, Portland, OR) for com-
pletion of the baseline survey. This unique identifier
helped mitigate duplication of surveys in instances where
an employee only partially completed the survey in a ses-
sion, and provided user-anonymity during the survey and
subsequent data analysis
The voluntary survey took approximately 15-20 minutes
to complete and was scheduled to remain open for a per-
iod of four weeks. Weekly updates were provided to each
cluster’s primary contacts via email which included LHD
response rates for their health departments. Reminder
emails could then be sent out through their listservs, with-
out indication of who had responded or not. The aim was
to achieve an 80% response rate from each LHD during
the survey period, and extensions to the four-week win-
dow were provided on request.
Survey contents and analysis
The JH ~ PHIRST is an anonymous online survey instru-
ment consisting of a demographic section and attitude/
belief sections focusing on health department workers’
attitudes and beliefs toward public health emergency
response, for each of four emergency scenarios (weather-
related event, pandemic influenza, radiological ‘dirty’
bomb terrorism event, and inhalational anthrax bioter-
rorism event). For each scenario, respondents were also
asked for their willingness to respond in three contexts: if
required, if asked but not required, and regardless of
severity. Responses to the attitude/belief statements were
based on a 9-point Likert scale with a response of ‘1’ indi-
cating strong agreement with the question, a response of
‘5’ indicating neutrality, and a response of ‘9’ indicating
strong disagreement with the question. Respondents
could also indicate “don’t know.”
Prior to analysis, responses to the attitude and belief
statements were dichotomized into categories of ≤ 4
(’positive response’) versus > 5 (‘negative response’). This
dichotomized approach was applied in accordance with
similar previous studies performed using close variations
of this survey tool [4,5]. Levels of WTR were evaluated
from several perspectives: clusters, urban/rural designa-
tion, respondent demographic characteristics and respon-
dent attitudes/beliefs regarding public health emergency
response.
Witte’s Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) is
useful for understanding determinants of WTR to public
health emergencies [5,10]. The EPPM predicts that, in
the face of uncertain risk, people are more apt to engage
in proactive behaviors if they perceive the threat asso-
ciated with a hazard as legitimate and can address a
desired intervention efficaciously. One of the four EPPM
categories was assigned to each respondent using the
threat and efficacy dimensions (each comprised of two
relevant attitude/belief statements - Methodology1, Addi-
tional file 1), with low and high perceived threat and effi-
cacy categories calculated as described in previous EPPM
survey-based research [11]. Summary statistics were cal-
culated for demographic characteristics and for the WTR
contexts by cluster and urban/rural designation. General-
ized linear latent and mixed models (GLLAMM) analyses
[18] were performed to compare the dichotomized WTR
responses between demographic characteristics, urban/
rural designation, EPPM categories, and attitude/belief
statements. These multilevel analyses were adjusted for
all demographic characteristics in the survey, and
adjusted for potential correlations between attitudes/
beliefs among participants within an LHD and among
LHDs within a cluster. Responses to the attitude/belief
statements were compared between the urban/rural des-
ignations and across EPPM categories. The Wald test
[19] was calculated as an overall assessment of differ-
ences in predictors with more than two categories (e.g.,
job classification). P-values of 0.05 were considered sta-
tistically significant for these analyses; results with
p-values > 0.05 were noted as “NS” for non-significant.
All analyses were performed using STATA version 11.1
(STATA Corp., College Station, TX, 2010).
Results
A total of eight LHD clusters (out of eight recruited
clusters, from nine U.S. states), were given access to the
survey and responded to it starting in April 2009 and
ending in June 2010 (Table S1 [Supplementary tables,
designated by “S”, are unpublished, but are available for
review by contacting the corresponding author]). Four
of these eight clusters were considered rural (in Idaho,
Minnesota, Missouri, and Virginia) and four were con-
sidered urban (in Florida, Indiana, Oregon/Washington,
and Wisconsin). Respondents from the rural clusters
ranged in number from 75 to 216 for a total of 630;
respondents from the urban clusters ranged in number
from 138 to 1184 for a total of 2363. The overall
response rate was 66% based on numbers of eligible
respondents provided by the LHDs. Table 1 shows the
distributions of respondents’ demographic characteristics
by urban/rural designation and over all respondents.
The largest difference between urban and rural demo-
graphics was in education with 58% of rural and 67% of
urban respondents having at least a bachelor’s degree.
The next largest difference occurred for gender with
88% and 81% female respondents in the rural and urban
clusters, respectively. Rural clusters had 62% and urban
clusters 57% of their respondents with five or more
years in the organization. Table S2 shows the distribu-
tion of the demographic characteristics by the individual
clusters.
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Figure 1 shows the levels of WTR for the if required
context, across scenarios, by cluster and indicating the
urban/rural classification of each cluster. Table 2 shows
the levels of WTR by the 12 context/scenario combina-
tions for the urban and rural respondents, and all respon-
dents. Rural respondents had higher levels of WTR than
urban respondents with the differences across these
WTR context/scenario combinations ranging from 2 to
12% (Table 2). The largest of these differences (8 to 12%)
for the if asked and regardless of severity WTR contexts,
occurred for the pandemic influenza, radiological ‘dirty’
Table 1 Respondent characteristics by urban/rural
designation
Designationa
Respondent Characteristicsb Rural Urban Overall
Females(%) 87.5 81.2 82.6
Age: 40 years +(%) 70.2 69.8 69.9
Bachelors Degree +(%) 57.8 67.2 65.3
Work in organization 5 years +(%) 62.1 56.7 57.9
Work in profession 10 years +(%) 52.9 48.7 49.6
First responder role(%) 35.9 35.8 35.8
Dependent family member(%) 67.4 65.7 66.1
Number of respondents 630 2363 2993
a Rural clusters include: MO, MN, ID, VA; urban clusters include: FL, WI, OR/WA,
IN
b Characteristics are binary, e.g. Female and Male, Work in organization < 5 years
and 5 years+
Figure 1 Percent agreement for willingness-to-respond if required across clusters and disaster scenarios. Cluster (State): FL(Florida), MO
(Missouri), MN(Minnesota), ID(Idaho), VA(Virginia), OR/WA(Oregon/Washington), WI(Wisconsin), IN(Indiana). Classification: U- Urban, R-Rural.
Disaster Scenario: W - Weather-related, P - Pandemic Influenza, D - Radiological ‘dirty’ bomb, A - Anthrax bioterrorism.
Table 2 Percent agreement for willingness-to-respond
(WTR) contexts by urban/rural designation of clusters
and by scenario
Designationa
Scenario WTR context Rural Urban Overall
Weather-
related
If required 94.0 92.3 92.7
If asked but not
required
86.8 81.7 82.8
Regardless of severity 81.3 75.2 76.5
Pandemic
influenza
If required 93.0 90.4 91.0
If asked but not
required
87.2 77.8 79.9
Regardless of severity 86.5 76.3 78.6
Radiological ‘dirty’
bomb
If required 78.7 73.0 74.3
If asked but not
required
71.2 59.6 62.2
Regardless of severity 59.3 51.3 53.1
Anthrax
bioterrorism
If required 82.6 79.6 80.3
If asked but not
required
75.6 67.0 68.9
Regardless of severity 70.4 62.9 64.6
a Rural clusters include: MO, MN, ID, VA; urban clusters include: FL, WI, OR/WA,
IN
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bomb, and anthrax bioterrorism scenarios. Over all
respondents, WTR levels in the radiological ‘dirty’ bomb
and anthrax bioterrorism scenarios were lower than for
comparable contexts in the weather-related and pan-
demic influenza scenarios. For the if asked context, the
overall WTR levels were 83% (weather-related scenario),
80% (pandemic influenza scenario), 69% (anthrax bioter-
rorism scenario), and 62% (radiological ‘dirty’ bomb sce-
nario). The lowest overall WTR levels occurred for the
regardless of severity context with 53% for the radiologi-
cal ‘dirty’ bomb scenario. Comparing WTR contexts, the
if required context generally had an 11% higher WTR
level than if asked, and a range of 12% (pandemic influ-
enza scenario) to 21% (radiological ‘dirty’ bomb scenario)
higher WTR level than regardless of severity. Table S3
shows the levels of WTR by cluster for these 12
combinations.
Table 3 compares levels of WTR between the rural
and urban respondents for the 12 context/scenario com-
binations with odds ratios (ORs) to assess the degree of
association between the respondent groups and WTR.
The analyses were adjusted for all demographic charac-
teristics included in the survey, and take into account
the within-cluster and within-LHD correlations of
responses. The intraclass correlations for clusters and
LHDs were low with all but a few instances ranging
from < 0.001 to 0.10. For four of the 12 WTR context/
scenario combinations, the OR and 95% confidence
intervals (95%CI) showed significant differences between
urban and rural respondents, with rural respondents
having higher odds of self-reported response willingness
than urban respondents (OR (95%CI): WTR regardless
of severity for the weather-related scenario: 1.59 (1.24,
2.03); WTR if asked for the pandemic influenza sce-
nario: 2.37 (1.72, 3.27); WTR regardless of severity for
the pandemic influenza scenario: 2.24 (1.11, 4.54); and
WTR if required for the radiological ‘dirty’ bomb sce-
nario: 1.5 (1.13, 1.99).
When comparing categories within each demographic
characteristic, adjusted for all the other characteristics,
gender, age, education, first-responder role and having
dependent family members showed consistent significant
patterns of differences in WTR levels (Table S4). In six of
the 12 WTR context/scenario combinations, the ORs
that were statistically significant for WTR, comparing
female to male respondents, ranged from 0.57 to 0.66. In
eight of the 12 combinations, the significant ORs, com-
paring respondents at least 40 years of age to the younger
respondents, ranged from 1.26 to 1.58. In seven of the 12
combinations, comparisons of WTR between respon-
dents with at least a bachelor’s degree and those with less
education showed significant ORs from 1.26 to 1.90.
Significant differences in WTR levels occurred in all con-
text/scenario combinations for the first responder and
dependent family member comparisons. The ORs, com-
paring respondents who considered themselves to be in a
first responder role to those who did not consider them-
selves to be in that role, ranged from 1.7 to 2.6. The ORs
for WTR, comparing respondents with a family member
to care to those without that responsibility, ranged from
0.59 to 0.78.
Using the threat-efficacy perspective of the EPPM, com-
parisons of WTR levels across EPPM categories showed
consistent patterns across almost all context/scenario
combinations (Table 4). Respondents in the high-threat/
low-efficacy (HT/LE), low-threat/high-efficacy (LT/HE),
and high-threat/high-efficacy(HT/HE) categories had sig-
nificantly higher odds of WTR than respondents in the
low-threat/low-efficacy (LT/LE) category, where the smal-
lest of these differences occurred for the HT/LE category.
The largest differences in WTR, comparing the efficacy
levels under the LT level (LT/HE to LT/LE categories),
occurred in the if required context of the pandemic influ-
enza scenario and anthrax bioterrorism scenario [OR(95%
CI): 25.1(7.9, 79.6), 14.5(8.0, 26.1), respectively]. Large dif-
ferences in WTR were also observed when comparing
Table 3 Comparison of willingness to respond between urban and rural designations of the clusters by scenario
Emergency Scenarios
Weather-related Pandemic influenza Radiological ‘dirty’ bomb Anthrax bioterrorism
Rural/Urbana Rural/Urban Rural/Urban Rural/Urban
Willingness-to-respond context OR(95%CI)b OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI)
If required NSc NS 1.5 NS
(1.13, 1.99)
If asked but not required NS 2.37 NS NS
(1.72, 3.27)
Regardless of severity 1.59 2.24 NS NS
(1.24, 2.03) (1.11, 4.54)
a Rural clusters include: MO, MN, ID, VA; urban clusters include: FL, WI, OR/WA, IN
b The reference category for the odds ratio and 95% confidence interval [OR(95%CI)] is the urban designation
c NS - Not statistically significant at p = 0.05 level
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categories for the combined high vs combined low levels
(HT/HE to LT/LE) for the if required context of the
anthrax bioterrorism scenario, pandemic influenza sce-
nario, and radiological ‘dirty’ bomb scenario [OR(95%CI):
19.6(11.5, 33.5), 18.9(8.2, 43.2), 14.8(9.7, 22.5), respec-
tively]. For the LE level, respondents in the HT category
had slightly higher odds of being willing to respond than
those in the LT category (data not shown). For either level
of threat, respondents in the HE category had considerably
higher odds of being willing to respond than those in the
LE category. For these efficacy comparisons, the range of
ORs across WTR context/scenario combinations was
wider for the LT category (4.6 to 25.1) than for the HT
category (4.4 to 10.7).
Difference in agreement with most attitude/belief state-
ments comparing rural to urban respondents was most
evident for the pandemic influenza scenario, with ORs of
1.5 to 2.9 for agreement regarding perceptions about
severity of health consequences, likelihood of being asked
to report, knowledge of public health impact, awareness
and skills for responsibilities, ability to safely get to work,
self-efficacy, and importance of one’s role in agency
response (Table 5). For the anthrax bioterrorism
scenario, the ORs ranged from 1.4 to 2 for agreement
regarding perceived likelihood of being asked to report,
family prepared to function in absence, importance of
one’s role in agency response, and response efficacy.
To evaluate the relationships between scenario-specific
WTR and attitudes/beliefs regarding public health emer-
gency response, these ORs (Table S5) were ranked from
high to low within each WTR context/scenario combi-
nation. The following attitude/belief statements consis-
tently ranked among the leading modifiers of WTR,
revealing strong associations across the 12 context/sce-
nario combinations: being psychologically prepared; per-
ceived ability to safely get to work; confidence in
personal safety at work; and perceived ability to perform
duties (self-efficacy). Generally, the ORs for these atti-
tude/belief statements were highest (17 to 28) for the
pandemic influenza and anthrax bioterrorism scenarios
under the WTR if required context. Under the WTR if
required context, the perceived likelihood of being asked
to report to duty, and under WTR regardless of severity,
the perceived high impact of one’s response (response
efficacy), showed strong associations across all four
scenarios.
Table 4 Comparison of willingness to respond by Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) categorization of cluster
respondents by scenario
Naturally-occurring Emergency Scenarios
Weather-related Pandemic influenza
EPPM Categoriesa EPPM Categories
LT/HE HT/LE HT/HE LT/HE HT/LE HT/HE
Willingness-to-respond context OR(95%CI)b OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) Wald p OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) Wald p
If required 10.29 2.32 10.3 < 0.001 25.09 3.02 18.82 < 0.001
(4.72, 22.45) (1.51, 3.56) (5.12, 20.72) (7.90, 79.64) (1.97, 4.62) (8.19, 43.23)
If asked but not required 4.57 1.39 3.59 < 0.001 6.24 1.78 6.78 < 0.001
(3.06, 6.82) (1.05, 1.85) (2.56, 5.02) (4.06, 9.59) (1.34, 2.37) (4.64, 9.92)
Regardless of severity 5.93 NSd 6.55 < 0.001 5.58 1.83 10.72 < 0.001
(4.12, 8.54) (4.68, 9.16) (3.74, 8.32) (1.39, 2.42) (7.04, 16.34)
Terrorism-related Emergency Scenarios
Radiological ‘dirty’ bomb Anthrax bioterrorism
EPPM Categories EPPM Categories
LT/HE HT/LE HT/HE LT/HE HT/LE HT/HE
Willingness-to-respond context OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) Wald p OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) Wald p
If required 8.76 1.97 14.79 < 0.001 14.5 2.23 19.63 < 0.001
(5.73, 13.39) (1.45, 2.67) (9.72, 22.49) (8.04, 26.13) (1.60, 3.09) (11.51, 33.47)
If asked but not required 7.25 1.47 8.18 < 0.001 8.24 1.88 11.01 < 0.001
(5.14, 10.24) (1.10, 1.95) (6.04, 11.08) (5.60, 12.13) (1.40, 2.52) (7.79, 15.54)
Regardless of severity 9.85 1.21 12.94 < 0.001 8.78 1.57 13.18 < 0.001
(7.02, 13.81) (0.89, 1.65) (9.48, 17.64) (6.06, 12.72) (1.17, 2.10) (9.33, 18.60)
a EPPM categories: LT/LE - Low threat/low efficacy, LT/HE - Low threat/high efficacy, HT/LE - High threat/low efficacy, HT/HE - High threat/high efficacy
b Reference category for odds ratio and 95% confidence intervals [OR(95%CI)] is LT/LE
c Tests null hypothesis of no difference between EPPM categories
d NS - Not statistically significant at p = 0.05 level
Barnett et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:164
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/164
Page 6 of 11
Discussion
A local public health workforce’s willingness to respond
(WTR) is an essential component of effective management
of public health emergencies. Previous research on local
public health agency workers has examined WTR in a
pandemic influenza scenario [10,11], making this a novel
study in its examination of WTR to multiple emergency
scenarios among this occupational cohort and its identifi-
cation of approaches that could be taken to improve their
WTR. Although the National Response Framework
encourages preparation for emergencies using an all-
hazards approach [20], our results underscore that LHD
workers’ WTR is scenario-specific. WTR was shown to be
greater for naturally-occurring emergency scenarios
(weather-related and pandemic influenza) than for terror-
ism-related emergency scenarios (radiological ‘dirty’ bomb
and anthrax bioterrorism) in all contexts (Table S3).
Between the terrorism-related scenarios, workers’ surveyed
Table 5 Comparison of agreement on attitude/belief statements between urban and rural designation of clusters by
scenario
Emergency Scenarios
Weather-
related
Pandemic
influenza
Radiological ‘dirty’
bomb
Anthrax
bioterrorism
Attitude/Belief Statements Rural/Urbana Rural/Urban Rural/Urban Rural/Urban
OR(95%CI)b OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI) OR(95%CI)
Perceived likelihood of occurrence in this region NSc NS 0.7 0.6
(0.51, 0.95) (0.41, 0.88)
Perceived severe health consequences likely NS 1.47 NS NS
(1.05, 2.05)
Perceived likelihood of being asked to report to duty NS 2.87 1.68 2
(1.42, 5.80) (1.17, 2.40) (1.39, 2.90)
Perceived knowledge about the public health impact NS 1.63 NS NS
(1.07, 2.47)
Perceived awareness of role-specific responsibilities 2.24 1.71 NS NS
(1.74, 2.87) (1.03, 2.83)
Perceived skills for role-specific responsibilities NS 2.12 NS NS
(1.29, 3.49)
Psychologically prepared NS NS NS NS
Perceived ability to safely get to work NS 1.9 1.45 NS
(1.26, 2.86) (1.10, 1.91)
Confidence in personal safety at work NS NS NS NS
Perceived ability to perform duties (Self-Efficacy) NS 2.02 NS NS
(1.36, 3.02)
Perceived that family is prepared to function in absence 1.33 NS 1.42 1.36
(1.02, 1.73) (1.15, 1.75) (1.04, 1.76)
Health Department’s perceived ability to provide timely
information
NS NS NS NS
Perceived ability to address public questions NS NS NS NS
Perceived importance of one’s role in the agency’s overall
response
NS 1.76 1.41 1.57
(1.26, 2.45) (1.00, 1.97) (1.09, 2.26)
Perceived need for pre-event preparation and training NS NS NS NS
Perceived need for psychological support during event NS NS NS NS
Perceived need for post-event psychological support NS NS NS NS
Perceived high impact of one’s response (Response Efficacy) NS NS NS 1.37
(1.01, 1.87)
a Rural clusters include: MO, MN, ID, VA; urban clusters include: FL, WI, OR/WA, IN
b The reference category for the odds ratio and 95% confidence interval [OR(95%CI)] is the urban designation
c NS - Not statistically significant at p = 0.05 level
Barnett et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:164
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/164
Page 7 of 11
WTR was considerably lower for the radiological ‘dirty’
bomb.
These results suggest that all-hazards preparedness
efforts may not be equally impactful on WTR among dif-
ferent hazards. Implementing effective scenario-based
risk awareness campaigns among the LHD worker popu-
lation may have an impact on increasing their knowledge,
and thus their WTR [3]. Although warranting further
study, these findings might also reflect the influences on
WTR of scenario-based federal public health funding and
related preparedness requisites for LHDs. In the U.S.,
such scenario-based funding and activities in LHDs have
historically focused on bioterrorism (e.g. smallpox and
anthrax dispersal) and pandemic influenza threats, which
had higher WTR rates than for the radiological ‘dirty’
bomb scenario in our study.
Despite the geographic variability observed in WTR
rates in this study, our findings point to gaps in response
willingness as a significant surge capacity concern for
public health response across a diverse array of threats.
When employees across the eight LHD clusters were sur-
veyed as to their WTR regardless of severity, the percen-
tage of workers indicating they would not be willing to
respond ranged from 14 to 28% for a weather-related
event; 9 to 27% for pandemic influenza; 30 to 56% for a
radiological ‘dirty’ bomb; and 22 to 48% for an inhala-
tional anthrax bioterrorism event (Table S3). Given that
severe public health threats require all employees at all
skill levels, and in light of LHDs’ central position within
the public health emergency preparedness system, even
the lower bounds of these ranges present a threat to this
system’s operational effectiveness. Moreover, previous
research has shown local public health workers to be the
most ready and willing among several civil service and
hospital professional cohorts to respond to a pandemic
influenza event [21]. In light of this previous research,
the suboptimal levels of WTR observed across multiple
scenarios among the current study’s LHD cohort poten-
tially point to even larger willingness gaps in a variety of
responder cohorts, such as law enforcement and fire ser-
vices. Indeed, multi-scenario-based gaps in WTR among
police and fire departments merit further research
examination.
We believe that this study is also the first to explicitly
compare WTR rates between urban and rural local public
health agencies. It is important to include rural LHDs in
our investigation since only 4% of U.S. health depart-
ments serve populations greater than 500,000 [22] and
approximately 20% of Americans live in rural areas [23].
Rural jurisdictions are not immune to the broad spec-
trum of potential public health threats. While urban
areas may represent higher profile terrorism targets, rural
jurisdictions could be affected by evacuation orders,
decontamination considerations, or infectious disease
spread. Since many rural areas house critical infrastruc-
ture, including elements of the food system and impor-
tant bridges/roadways, they may themselves be targets of
potential terrorism threats.
Our findings suggest rural LHD workers may have sig-
nificantly higher odds of WTR across scenarios and
WTR contexts than their urban counterparts (Table 2
and Table 3). Increased levels of social cohesion in rural
communities may account for these increased WTR
levels, although this warrants further study. Cohesive
communities are characterized as sharing a common
vision and sense of belonging, possessing an appreciation
for the diversity of people’s backgrounds, and developing
strong and positive relationships among people with
different backgrounds in neighborhoods, schools and
workplaces [24].
According to Durkheim’s theory of social solidarity,
increased interdependence of individuals within a commu-
nity may be related to increased levels of social cohesion
[25]. This interdependence may be more pronounced in
rural communities that act as independent microcosms of
modern society, in which residents rely on one another for
daily life essentials. An increased level of social cohesion
may increase local public health workers’ sense of belong-
ing, duty, and responsibility to neighbors and coworkers,
thus potentially explaining the presentation of increased
WTR to an emergency situation among rural jurisdictions.
Recent research has shown 29% more Florida healthcare
workers reported WTR to a bioterrorism attack within
their community than elsewhere in their state [26]. In light
of these findings, and the lack of research on the effect of
social cohesion on willingness to respond, the likelihood
of the local public health workforce’s emergency response
in the context of social cohesion is seen as a potential area
for future investigation.
Local public health agencies have a median staff size of
13 [22], which emphasizes the imperative that all workers
are ready, willing, and able to respond to a public health
emergency if needed [6]. The diminishing numbers of
U.S. public health workers [14] reinforce the need to
ensure that LHD employees are sufficiently committed to
responding during an emergency. In six of the 12 WTR
context/scenario combinations, the ORs that were statis-
tically significant for WTR, comparing female to male
respondents, ranged from 0.57 to 0.66. Since the public
health workforce is comprised of 82.7% women [22], this
finding has significant implications for local public health
surge capacity. In addition, the public health workforce is
aging. According to a recent Association of State and Tri-
bal Health Officials (ASTHO) survey, 23% of the current
workforce is eligible to retire in 2012 [27]. In eight of the
12 combinations, the significant ORs, comparing respon-
dents at least 40 years of age to the younger respondents,
ranged from 1.26 to 1.58. As more willing local public
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health responders approach retirement, it is now more
important than ever to maximize the willingness of all
available personnel to enhance the effectiveness of emer-
gency response.
Given fiscal austerity challenges facing the public
health infrastructure [28], efforts to increase funding for
the LHD workforce may be extremely difficult. However,
this study’s findings can inform the augmentation of cur-
rent LHD training programs and adaptation of agency
policies. According to the EPPM, messages need to con-
vey both threat and efficacy in order to elicit intended
desirable protective behaviors [29]. Comparisons of WTR
levels across EPPM categories consistently indicate that
regardless of perceived threat, efficacy increased respon-
dents’ WTR (Table 4). The enhanced effect of efficacy,
compared to threat, on WTR is consistent with findings
from previous research [10,11]. Bandura has modeled
behavior change and maintenance as a function of self-
efficacy and response efficacy [30]. A review of the litera-
ture shows efficacy to have a strong association with the
successful performance of myriad health behaviors,
including cigarette smoking, weight control, exercise, and
contraception use [31]. The importance of threat and
efficacy in understanding emergency response behavior
has been highlighted in recent research in Washington
State healthcare workers. In this cohort, self-reported
ability was higher than self-reported willingness to report
to work for an influenza pandemic, but self-reported will-
ingness was higher than self-reported ability for a severe
earthquake event [32]. This distinction by scenario sug-
gests that perceived threat and efficacy associated with
each event has a distinct impact on behavior.
This study’s finding of efficacy, as a crucial modifier of
response willingness across scenarios, has important impli-
cations for designing novel preparedness curricula for
LHD employees. Namely, our data suggest that such curri-
cula could usefully employ a variety of efficacy-focused
cognitive interventions to achieve the desired affective out-
come of increased WTR.
Curricular interventions of this nature could include
explicit emphasis on household preparedness-building
activities for LHD employees with dependents. Personnel
with dependents were shown to have lower odds of self-
reported WTR for an emergency (range of ORs: 0.59 to
0.78) than those without this responsibility. To increase
the level of WTR among this cohort, preparedness curri-
cula can instruct LHD employees on the essentials of
making family preparedness plans and kits, and poten-
tially requiring employees to do so. While this may seem
like an unfunded requirement, a curriculum that uses
cognitive intervention for achieving affective outcomes
could emphasize the benefit outweighing the cost of
preparedness plans and kits, by highlighting their impor-
tance in optimizing the safety of dependents and
enhancing employees’ comfort level in reporting to work
during an emergency.
LHD employees who perceived themselves as having
important roles in their agency’s emergency response
efforts consistently had higher odds of self-reported
WTR to all four surveyed scenarios regardless of severity.
Workers who perceived themselves as likely to be asked
by their agencies to report to duty also had higher odds
of WTR if required. Accordingly, to boost willingness,
preparedness curricula might aim to build employees’
sense of response efficacy by highlighting how and why
each of their roles is important, and emphasizing that
each employee be considered a vital contributor to an
agency’s response. Curricula can enhance self-efficacy by
instructing employees on the range of role-specific activ-
ities they may be expected to perform, and illustrating
how their daily skill sets might transfer readily to this
spectrum of response expectations. For example, finance
support staff within LHDs would receive role-specific
instruction and reassurance on how their everyday activ-
ities, (e.g., coordinating daily inventory and payroll)
would apply to their public health emergency response
efforts (e.g., managing emergency supply inventory and
monitoring overtime payroll in a public health crisis).
Staffing challenges facing LHDs [14] only heighten the
importance of instilling a mindset of everyone being
necessary in a team response, through efficacy-focused
preparedness curricula.
Local public health agencies’ policies also have the
potential to enhance their workers’ WTR. Geographic
variations across clusters (Table S3) suggest a need for
local WTR assessments as the basis for tailored curricular
efforts to enhance response willingness rates in LHDs.
Despite these variations, however, certain commonalities
emerged with generalizable training implications. Across
clusters, LHD workers consistently reported increased
WTR if they perceived it to be a requirement (Table S3).
LHDs may wish to reexamine their policies on employee
requirements for responding to different emergencies in
order to increase potential likelihood of response. The
impact on WTR of policies requiring employees to work,
including those imposed by unions, in oaths taken by
sworn personnel, and by the health department, local
government or state government, needs to be explored in
future research.
Further, irrespective of geographic location or rural/
urban status, WTR was consistently and markedly lowest
for the radiological ‘dirty’ bomb scenario. This finding
suggests a need for intensive and broad-scale efforts to
enhance LHD employees’ awareness of the role of public
health in radiological emergency responses and augment
their sense of efficacy in contributing to such responses.
Clearly-articulated, LHD policies that directly address
LHD employees’ concerns about safety at work and at
Barnett et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:164
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/164
Page 9 of 11
home may enhance their comfort level toward respond-
ing to radiological or other threats.
Certain limitations of this study must be acknowledged.
First, results are based on survey data and may not be
predictive of behavior in an actual, real-world response.
Given the unpredictable variability of disasters and
inability to control for various confounding factors, a
prospective study was conducted to limit bias and yield
the most methodologically sound results. Second, the
recruitment of proximate LHDs to form the study’s clus-
ters was based on convenience and snowball sampling
rather than random sampling, having the potential to
limit generalizability. This research was not intended to
provide representative results as from a nationwide sur-
vey, in which case the sampling design would have an
impact on the results and associated confidence intervals.
While a geographically and demographically diverse set
of clusters was included in order to maximize external
validity of our findings, conclusions may not be valid in
locations not analyzed due to external factors, including
past experiences with disaster scenarios or differences in
local public health infrastructure. Third, while the four
scenarios in the study reflect categories of high-conse-
quence events, the surveyed scenarios do not reflect the
entire all-hazards continuum. Fourth, the 2009 H1N1
influenza pandemic overlapped the survey window for all
but one of the study’s LHD clusters. Actual experience
with this event may have influenced responses to this
scenario category.
Conclusions
“All disasters begin locally [33]“ is a guiding maxim for
preparedness and response. Planning for LHDs to figure
centrally in emergency response requires efforts to
increase the likelihood that this workforce will respond
when asked to do so. Efficacy-focused curricular interven-
tions with desired affective outcomes, coupled with
amendments to agency policy based on scenario-specific
and jurisdictional, demographic, and attitudinal differ-
ences, may have the potential to increase the response
willingness of this vital cohort.
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